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 Most of the theory of tax reform is concerned with marginal reforms.  A point where no welfare-improving1
reform of this type exists is only a local optimum.  The optimum taxation literature, however, rarely distinguishes
between local and global optima (and makes liberal use of ad hoc assumptions to avoid undesirable local optima).
COMMODITY TAXATION AND SOCIAL WELFARE:
THE GENERALISED RAMSEY RULE
1. Introduction
This paper is concerned with the welfare economics of commodity taxation.  It focuses both
on the "tax reform" problem (i.e. how a given system of commodity taxes can be improved) and on
the "optimum taxation" problem (i.e. the choice of optimum taxes).  As is already clear from the
literature, there is a straightforward connection between the two problems, since an optimum is
essentially a point where no welfare-improving reform is possible.  In that sense, much of the theory
of optimum taxation can be seen as a special application of the theory of tax reform.1
The paper has three specific objectives.  First, we present a synthesis of the classical Ramsey
tax problem (Ramsey, 1927) which attempts to clarify the relation between different approaches to
this problem.  Second, we show how many of the standard results can be generalised in a second-best
general equilibrium framework using the notion of "shadow taxes", defined as the difference
between consumer prices and shadow prices.  Third, we try to clarify the relation between alternative
distributional assumptions and the structure of optimum taxes.
Our analysis makes considerable use of the "generalised Ramsey rule" for optimum taxation,
derived in Guesnerie (1979) and Drèze and Stern (1987).  This is a general-equilibrium extension
of the classical "Ramsey rule", due to Ramsey (1927).  The generalised Ramsey rule allows for a
wide range of distortions in the economy, which are captured by a vector of "shadow prices".  Many
of the standard results continue to apply, after replacing actual commodity taxes by "shadow taxes".
Conditional on the knowledge of shadow prices, the generalised Ramsey rule is a powerful tool for
 On the calculation of shadow prices and their application to tax reform and public policy, see also Ahmad,2
Coady and Stern (1988); Ahmad and Stern (1991); and Coady (1997).
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the analysis of commodity taxation in distorted economies.  The issue of how shadow prices are
computed is outside the scope of this paper, and belongs to the theory of cost-benefit analysis.  The
relation between cost-benefit analysis, tax reform and optimum taxation is explored in Drèze and
Stern (1987); this paper builds on the general approach presented there.2
In general terms, indirect taxes fulfill three distinct roles.  First, they generate government
revenue.  Second, indirect taxes can be used for distributional purposes.  Third, they have allocative
effects.  While the classical Ramsey rule focuses on the revenue-raising objective, the generalised
Ramsey rule integrates these ree concerns: (1) revenue collection, (2) interpersonal redistribution,
and (3) resource allocation.  This insight provides an important bridge between the literature
generated by Ramsey’s original paper, on the one hand, and a somewhat independent literature which
focuses on taxes as a means of achieving a better allocation of resources (e.g. the focus on “Pigovian
taxes” in environmental economics belongs to the latter tradition).
The outline of the paper is as follows.  In the next section, we explore various aspects of the
“classical Ramsey tax problem”.  Section 3 shows how shadow prices can be used to extend the
classical results in a general equilibrium framework, based on the “generalised Ramsey rule”.
Section 4 examines the relation between income distribution and the structure of optimum taxes.
The last section concludes.
2. The Classical Ramsey Tax Problem
For expositional clarity, we begin with a brief overview of the classical Ramsey tax problem.
 Important contributions to the analysis of the Ramsey tax problem include Ramsey (1927), Dixit (1970,3
1975), Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), Diamond (1975), Atkinson and Stern (1974), Sandmo (1974), Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1976), and Deaton and Stern (1986). Useful presentations of the main results can be found in Sandmo (1976),
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), Auerbach (1985), Dixit (1987), and Myles (1995), among others.
 As Ramsey himself put it: “The problem I propose to tackle is this: a given revenue is to be raised by4
proportionate taxes on some of or all uses of income, the taxes on different uses being possibly at different rates; how
should these rates be adjusted in order that the decrement of utility may be a minimum?” (Ramsey, 1927, p.47).
 Most of the notation in this paper follows Drèze and Stern (1987), partly to ensure that the relation between5
the two papers is as transparent as possible.  In particular, commodities are indexed by subscripts i=1,...n, and consumers
(when there are several) by superscripts h=1,...,H; other subscripts indicate partial derivatives. Also, we use bold type
to indicate vectors.
4
The results presented in this section are not new, but we hope to clarify th  relation between different
ways of deriving and interpreting them.  We also take our first step towards generalisation, by3
looking at the problem from the point of view of "tax reform" rather than "optimum taxation".
2.1 The model
The problem initially posed by Ramsey (1927) is as follows:  how should commodity taxes
be set so as to minimise the loss of utility to the consumer subject to raising a given amount of
revenue?  Formally, this problem may be written as:4
Max. V(p+t) s.t.         t.x(p+t) = T (1)
   t
where p / (p,...,p) is a vector of producer prices, t / (t,...,t) a vector of commodity taxes, V(.) the1 n          1 n
indirect utility function, x(.) the n-dimensional vector of net consumer demands and T the amount
of revenue to be raised.  The first-order conditions of this optimisation problem lead directly to the5
"Ramsey rule", on which more below.  Two aspects of this formulation of the problem are worth
noting: (i) there is a single consumer, and (ii) producer prices are assumed to be fixed.  The problem
MV(
Mti
' &â xi % ë (xi % t.
Mx
Mti
) (3)
 Textbook presentations of the Ramsey tax problem often rule out lump-sum transfers (i.e. m/0); we return6
to this issue further on. Our formulation of the problem helps to clarify the underlying distributional assumptions.
 Note that V reflects a particular (arbitrary) cardinalization of V, which also affects ë.  Any cardinalization7 *
(e.g. money-metric utility) will do.
 The generalization to simultaneous marginal changes in all taxes is straigh forward and is discussed later on.8
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also appears to have a "partial equilibrium" format, but in section 3 below we show that it does have
general equilibrium foundations in a specific class of cases.
Our own starting point is a variant of the problem initially posed by Ramsey.  Following the
same notation as in (1), consider an economy with a single consumer who has utility V(p+t,m),
where m is a lump-sum transfer from the g vernment.  Let T / t.x - m denote government revenue.6
Social welfare in this economy may then be written as:
V  / V(p+t,m) + ë(t.x - m) (2)*
where ë is a suitable (positive) "shadow price" for government revenue.  We start from an arbitrary7
vector of commodity taxes, say t , and consider a small change dt from t  (a "tax reform").  We begin0         0
with the simple case where the tax reform consists of changing a single tax, say t.  Giv n  smalli
8
change dt in t (with dq/dt) the change in social welfare (or the “marginal social value of t”) is:i  i  i i ,            i
where â/V  is the marginal utility of income.  As (3)indicates, a small change dt induces: (1) am             i
change in utility equivalent to a lump-sum transfer of -x (using Roy's identity), and (2) a change ini
MV(
Mti
/ (ë&â) xi % ë äi (4)
äi / t.
Mx
Mqi
(5)
ói /
t. Mx
Mqi
xi
(6)
6
revenue of (x + t.Mx/Mq).  The two components have to be added, with suitable weights, to derivei  i
the total change in social welfare.  The two components differ by the term t.Mx/Mq, which may bei
termed the "marginal deadweight loss" (MDL) from the proposed tax change.
2.2 The deadweight loss
Equation (3) may also be written as
where
is the marginal deadweight loss and can be interpreted as the indirect change in revenue arising from
the tax change.  For convenience we also define the "normalised" MDL as:
which, much like an elasticity, is independent of the choice of units.  The first term in (4) is zero if
and only ifë and â are the same, i.e. government revenue and private income are deemed to have the
same marginal social value.  In that case, the MDL is a correct first-order measure of the change in
social welfare induced by a small change in t.  If ë and â are not the same, then MDL can still bei
 On this, see Drèze (1998), and the literature cited there.9
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thought of as a useful notional quantity which measures some kind of (usually negative) efficiency
effect of extra taxes.
The interpretation of ä as an efficiency effect can be clarified by relating the marginali
deadweight loss to a more general criterion of cost-benefit analysis, the "aggregate benefits criterion"
(ABC).  The ABC criterion for evaluating  particular policy change (e.g. a public-sector project,9
a tax reform, or a modification of quantity controls) consists of asking every agent in the economy
how much the change is "worth" to him or her in terms of some pre-specified numéraire, and taking
the unweighted sum of all these net benefits as a measure of the social worth of the proposed change.
By analogy, it is tempting to suggest using the MDL as a measure of the welfare effect of a small tax
change.  The idea, much as with the ABC criterion, is that if the MDL is positive, then the loser (the
consumer) can notionally compensate the gainer (the government) for renouncing the proposed
change: for a small change dt, x is the net loss to the consumer, (x + t.Mx/Mq) is the net benefit toi  i        i  i
the government, and the MDL is the difference.  This suggestion, however, capsizes not only on the
usual pitfalls of "compensation criteria" but also because the notion that private income and
government revenue do not have the same arginal social value (i.e. âë) is a central motivation for
commodity taxation in the first place.
Deadweight loss measures, however, do have a role in identifying desirable tax reforms that
leave revenue unchanged.  To see this, let us consider the trade-off between consumer welfare and
government revenue when t varies (locally).  More precisely, let us ask how much revenue is raisedi
when the tax on commodity i is increased to the extent that the consumer suffers a decline in utility
Äi /
xi % t.
Mx
Mqi
xi
/ 1 % ói (7)
 Equivalently, one could consider how much consumer welfare declines when the tax on commodity i is10
raised just enough to raise one unit of extra revenue.  In both cases, what matters is the trade-off between utility and
revenue.
 Alternatively, a small change (dt,dt) which leaves utility unchanged with dt>0, increases the tax revenue.11 i j       i
8
equivalent to the loss of one unit of income.  The latter convention implies dt = 1/x, and the10 i  i
increase in revenue from such a tax change (say Ä) is then:i
Here, the numerator measures the responsiveness of tax revenue (T) to a small change in t and thei
denominator captures the responsiveness of consumer utility.  The atio between the two is the trade-
off between revenue and utility.  From (7), it immediately follows that, if ó > ó, then a (marginal)i  j
switch from t to t is desirable.  That is, a small change (dt,dt) which leaves T unchanged, with dtj  i         i j       i
> 0, improves consumer utility and therefore (given that T is unchanged) social welfare.  Thus, tax11
reform should aim at switching away from commodities with a high normalized MDL towards those
with a low normalized MDL.
In short, the MDL has two possible interpretations.  First, it is a measure of change in social
welfare under specific (and strong) distributional assumptions.  Second, it can be interpreted in terms
of a trade-off between revenue and utility, i.e. it is a correct measure of welfare change for tax
reforms that leave revenue unchanged.
2.3 An alternative formula
Going back to (3) and (4), the same identities may be written as follows, using the Slutsky
MV(
Mti
' & b xi % ë t.
Mxc
Mqi
(8)
b / MV
(
Mm
' â & ë % ë t. Mx
Mm
(9)
MV(
Mti
' & b xi % ë ä
c
i (10)
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equation:
where
and x (.) denotes compensated demand functions.  Following Drèze and Stern (1987), we refer toc
b as the "marginal social value of transfer".  Indeed, b measures the change in social welfare induced
by a small increase in the lump-sum transfer m.  Note that, much as in (3) and (4), the last term in
(9) (the "tax proensity" t.Mx/Mm, multiplied by ë) may be thought of as a marginal deadweight loss
from a lump-sum transfer.  It may seem surprising that lump-sum transfers involve a deadweight
loss.  However, in a second-best environment, actual lump-sum transfers (as opposed to the
"notional" transfers involved in compensation criteria) have non-neutral allocative effects that need
to be taken into account.  To put it another way, following much the same reasoning as in (7) we may
interpret (1+ t.Mx/Mm) as the trade-off between consumer welfare and government revenue when m
varies.  
By analogy with (4), (8) may also be written as:
äci / t.
Mxc
Mqi
(11)
ói /
1
xi
t. Mx
Mqi
'
1
xi
t.(Mx
c
Mqi
& xi
Mx
Mm
) ' óci ! c (12)
 See Hoff (1994) for a wider discussion of this issue.12
10
where
is an alternative measure of the MDL.  To distinguish ä  from ä, we shall refer to the former as theci  i
"marginal excess burden" (MEB), even though the terms "excess burden" and "deadweight loss" tend
to be used interchangeably in the literature.  Much as before, we define the normalised MEB as óci
/ ä /x.  Following the same reasoning as in the preceding sub-section, it is then easy to show fromci i
(10) that, if ó  > ó , then a switch from tax j to tax i is desirable.  This result also follows fromc  ci  j
noting that ó and ó differ only by a constant. Indeed, using the Slutsky equation again, we have:ci  i
where c /  t.Mx/Mm is the "tax propensity" (more precisely, the marginal propensity to pay taxes out
of lump-sum income). Given that ó  and ó differ only by a constant, it does not really matterci  i
whether the analysis focuses on the marginal deadweight loss (5) or on the marginal excess burden
(11).   When we extend the analysis to a many-consumer economy, however, this distinction will12
matter.
For future reference, we note that, using the symmetry of the Slutsky matrix, the normalised
marginal excess burden can also be written as:
óci /
t.
Mxci
Mq
xi
(13)
dV( ' (ë & â) x.dt % ë tMx
Mq
.dt (14)
dV( ' & b x.dt % ë t.Mx
c
Mq
.dt (15)
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In the optimum-taxation literature, the right-hand side is known as the "index of relative
discouragement" of commodity i (Mirrlees, 1976). For small taxes, the index of relativ
discouragement measures the proportionate reduction in the consumption of commodity i induced
by the tax system.  For non-marginal taxes, an alternative interpretation is also possible: the index
of relative discouragement is a first-order approximation to the proportionate change of compensated
demand that would be induced by a small “intensification” of the tax system (i.e. a change dt such
that dt=k.t for some k>0).
2.4 Vector tax changes
The preceding analysis extends without difficulty to the evaluation of a "tax reform" dt which
involves simultaneous changes in many taxes.  In this case, the change in social welfare is:
where the last term continues to be interpreted as the MDL.  Similarly, the extension of (10) is
simply:
where the last term is the MEB.  Also as before, a tax reform dt which leaves revenue unchanged
ói /
t. Mx
Mqi
xi
'
â&ë
ë
(16)
t.
Mxci
Mq
xi
'
b
ë
(17)
 Ramsey's (1927) seminal analysis focuses on the case where t =0 and infinitesimal taxes are introduced.13 0
Three points are worth noting about this special case.  First, when infini esimal taxes are introduced at t =0, bo h MDL0
and MEB are zero for any dt (i.e. all tax changes that yield a unit of revenue lead to th same first-order change in
12
(i.e. such that dT/dt  (x + t.Mx/Mq).dt = 0) is socially desirable if and only if it reduces the excess
burden.
2.5 Optimum taxes and the Ramsey rule
Using (4), the first-order condition for optimality of t, MV /Mt = 0, may be written as:i  i
*
Let us say that tis "unconstrained" if it can be chosen optimally.  Recalling (6), (16) states that thei
normalized MDL should be the same for all unconstrained taxes.  This statement can also be seen
as a corollary of our earlier result that switches from high-MDL to low-MDL taxes are welfare-
improving.  Using (10) and (11) and the symmetry of the Slutsky matrix, the first-order condition
(16) may also be restated as:
That is, the index of relative discouragement should be the same for all unconstrained taxes.  Thi
is known as the “Ramsey rule”.  If the amount of revenue to be raised is small, (17) implies that the
proportionate r duction in compensated demand induced by the tax system should be the same for
all taxable commodities - the formula proposed by Ramsey (1927).13
utility).  Second, as Ramsey demonstrated, examining second-order terms leads to his original "rule": "... the taxes
should be such as to reduce in the same proportion the production of each taxed commodity” (Ramsey, 1927, p.52).
Third, since income effects are second order in this special case, it does not matter whether the proportionate reduction
is measured along compensated and uncompensated demands.  In general, however, the distinction does matter.  While
Ramsey stated his original rule in terms of uncompensated demands, the "Ramsey rule" (equation 17) is best expressed
in terms of compensated demands.  Indeed, outside of this special case, the principle that commodity taxes should lead
to an equiproportionate reduction in uncompensated demands makes no intuitive sense.
  On this interpretation, see Auerbach (1985, p. 88).14
 Some readers may find it easier to think in terms of a lu p-sum tax L / (-m).  The two approaches are, of15
course, equivalent.
13
Various interpretations and special cases of the Ramsey rule have been discussed in the
literature.  For instance, several authors have discussed conditions under which the Ramsey rule boils
down to proportional taxes (variously defined).  The interested reader is referred to the papers
mentioned in footnote 4.
It is instructive to rewrite the right-hand side of (17) as [â+ët.(Mx/Mm)-ë]/ë, where the
numerator can be interpreted as the difference between the actual marginal social cost of raising
revenue through taxes (i.e. ë) and the cost if it were raised via lump-sum taxes.  As discussed14
below, under reasonable assumptions it can be shown that (b/ë) is eg ive.
2.6 Optimum lump-sum transfer
So far, we have assumed that the consumer's lump-sum income m is exogenous.  This is15
in the spirit of Ramsey's original formulation, which focuses on the use of commodity taxation as
a (second-best) ubstitute for lump-sum taxation.  Indeed, if m is a choice variable, then commodity
taxes are redundant.  To see this, note that the first-order condition for optimum choice of m is
simply (from (9)):
 If all taxes are unconstrained, the assumption m=0 is needed to make the problem non-trivial (see next16
section).
 We rule out the trivial case where b=0.17
 See Atkinson and Stern (1974) for further discussion.18
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b = 0 (18)
With b = 0, MV /Mt evaluated at t  = 0 is zero for each i (see (8)).  That is, there is no welfare gain* i   0
from a small move away from zero commodity taxation.  Alternatively, we may note that, if m is a
choice variable, then ë = â and t = 0 solve (16) and (18).
Now consider the case analysed by Ramsey, where m is not a choice variable and all taxes
are either unconstrained or zero. Multiplying both sides of (17) by tx and summing over i, we get:16 i i
b = (ë/T)(t.S.t) (19)
where T / t.x is total tax revenue and S is the Slutsky matrix.  Remembering that the Slutsky matrix
is negative semi-definite, the second-t rm on the r.h.s. is negative.  With ë > 0 by assumption, (19)17
implies that b and T have opposite signs.  Inmost sensible applications of this problem, T is positive,
implying b < 0.  Thus, a witch towards lump-sum taxation is desirable.18
If there are constrained non-zero taxes, b need not be negative.  For instance, if the consumer
is already burdened with large taxes on some commodities, a small increase in lump-sum income
(dm>0) may be socially desirable (b>0).  Note also that in the event where some taxes are
constrained and non-zero, an optimum lump-sum tax (b=0) does not entail equalizing â and ë (the
 Alternative assumptions are possible, e.g.m / M/I(q) where M is an exogenous parameter and I(q) is an19
index of consumer prices.  The choice of assumption i  not (in general) "neutral", and has to reflect the actual basis on
which lump-sum transfers are determined.
15
marginal social values of private income and government revenue, respectively).
2.7 Price normalization and the untaxed good
One issue that has caused much confusion in the literature is whether it is permissible to
assume that a particular commodity is untaxed (a d, if so, whether the choice of untaxed commodity
matters).  In other words, when does this assumption amount to nothing more than an innocuous
price normalization rule?
To begin with, consider the standard textbook case where m / 0 and all taxes are
"unconstrained".  Remember that producer prices are fixed; by choice of units, we can set them equal
to one, without loss of generality.  Further, this model is homogenous (of degree 0) in consumer
prices: if q and q' are collinear, nothing changes.  It follows that the consumer price of one
commodity can be given an arbitrary value, witho t loss of generality.  In particular, we can set q/pi i
for some pre-specified i, that is, assume that one commodity is untaxed.  To put it another way, let
t* be a solution of the Ramsey tax problem.  Then it is easy to verify that t' / k.t* + (k-1).p is also
a solution, for any positive k (indeed, t* an  t' correspond to the same consumer prices).  For any
given commodity i, we can opt for this commodity being untaxed by setting k / p/(p+t).i i i
*
Next, consider the extension where m is not identical to z ro.  As before, and in keeping with
the spirit of Ramsey's model, we assume that m is not a choice variable; instead, it takes an
exogenous value.   Note that the model is no longer homogeneous in q (th gh it is homogeneous19
in (m,q)).  Hence, an a priori restriction on q, e.g. q / 1 or q / p for some i, would (in general) be1    i  i
 See Dixit (1970), and the rejoinder by Sandmo (1974).20
 Leisure is often chosen as the untaxed good.  In some models this is an innocuous normalization rule, in21
others it is a substantive restriction.
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a real restriction, not just a normalization rule.  However, there is a complication: some restriction
is needed to make the problem interesting.  Indeed, if all taxes are "unconstrained", the problem
becomes trivial.  This is because, if m is non-zero, proportional taxes (t = k.p for ome k>0) are a
form of implicit lump-sum taxation and present an obvious "solution", though the problem they are
meant o solve has effectively vanished.  This feature of the model, however, is not a matter of20
concern: in the real world it is not difficult to identify non-taxable commodities (e.g. home-grown
food), and this is enough to make the problem non-trivial.  The crucial point is that, in this case,21
the choice of non-taxable commodity is not just a normalization rule: it is a matter of empirical
enquiry and affects the structure of optimum taxes.
2.8 The "inverse elasticity rule"
A popular rule of thumb in the field of commodity taxation is that the tax system should
weigh heavily on commodities with relatively inelastic demands. The basic idea is that (1) in
Ramsey’s model, commodity taxes are a second-best substitute for lump-sum taxation, and (2) a tax
on a commodity with inelastic demand works much like a l mp-sum tax, and is therefore a natural
substitute for it.  The intuition can also be developed as follows: the Ramsey rule requires equal
“discouragement” of each taxable commodity, and commodities with inelastic demands require
higher taxes to achieve the same discouragement.  Cross-price effects, of course, potentially
invalidate this reasoning.
 Note that there is no guarantee (in general) of µ/å being positive.  For instance, if the initial position is such22 i
that some commodities bear heavy positive taxes that cannot be removed (for political or other reasons), the planner may
wish to compensate for this by subsidising the commodities with unconstrained taxes.  The inverse elasticity rule then
suggests that subsidies should be concentrated on commodities with a low elasticity of demand.
17
Formally, suppose that t is unconstrained and that Mx/Mq is zero for all j such that ji andi     j i
t0.  Equation (16) then implies:j
(t/q) = µ/å (20)i i   i
where å is the own-price elasticity of demand for good i and µ/(â-ë)/ë is independent of i.  Thus,i
t  should be inversely proportional to å.   An analogous result holds in terms of compensatedi      i
22
demand elasticities.  This follows immediately from (17), under similar assumptions.
2.9 The many-person Ramsey rule
The results derived so far extend quite easily, but with some important qualifications, to the
case where there are many consumers.  As far as the structure of the problem is concerned, we
simply have to replace the utility function V(.) in (2) with a suitable social welfare function.
Assuming, as in much of the literature, that th  latter takes the Bergson-Samuelson form, we rewrite
(2) as:
V  / W(V (p+t,m),...,V(p+t,m )) + ë(t.x - Óm)                     (21)*  1 1 H H     hh
where m is a lump-sum transfer to consumer h (h=1...,H).  In order to extend the earlier results, weh
first introduce the following notation:
âh / MW
MV h
MV h
Mmh
(22)
bi / 3h b
h
xhi
xi
(25)
âi / 3h â
h
xhi
xi
(23)
bh / âh & ë % ë t Mx
h
Mmh
(24)
  Another standard term is “welfare wight”.  On the interpretation and measurement of welfare weights,23
see Stern (1977).
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The term â  can be interpreted as the “social valuation of the marginal utility of income” ofh
individual h; we shall also use the more standard (but less precise) term “social marginal utility of
income”.  We shall refer to b, a straightforward generalization of b (see (9)), as the “marginal23      h
social value of a transfer to person h”.  The quantities â d b are simply commodity-specifici  i
weighted averages of (â ) and (b), respectively, where the shares of different persons in totalh   h
consumption of commodity i  are used as weights.  The term b is known as the n t distributionali
t.
Mxci
Mq
xi
'
bi
ë
(26)
 These results are easily derived from (5), (11) and (26).24
19
characteristic of commodity i.      With these notational conventions, most of the earlier equations
go through after replacing âx everywhere with âx and bx with bx.  In particular, the Ramsey rulei   i i  i  i i
becomes:
Equation (26) is known as the “many-person Ramsey rule” (Diamond, 1975).  Note that the right-
hand side is no longer independent of i.  Instead of being the same for each commodity, the index
of relative discouragement should now be proportional to the net distributional characteristic.
In the many-person case, we can still define the marginal deadweight loss and the marginal
excess burden as in (5) and (11), respectively.  Note, however, that the difference between
(normalised) MDL and MEB is no longer constant across commodities.  Further, it is no longer
desirable to equate (normalised) MDL or MEB across commodities, unl s one is prepared to make
the further assumption that the distribution of income is in some sense optimal.  More precisely,
under the assumption that â  is identical for each h, the normalised MDL should be equalised acrossh
commodities; on the other hand, if b  is identical for each h, the normalised MEB should beh
equalised across commodities.  The distinction between these two distributional assumptions is24
discussed in section 4.
2.10 Further observations
 In the many-person case, the first term on the right-hand side of (15) has to be appropriately re-written, but25
it is still zero if there are optimum lump-sum transfers (b = 0 for each h).h
 For a more detailed exposition, see Drèze and Stern (1987).26
20
We end this section by noting, for future referenc , that when lump-sum transfers are feasible
it is possible to identify comparatively simple directions of welfare-improving tax reform (Dixit,
1975).  To illustrate, let us go back to equation (15), with b=0. Suppose that dt = -á.t for some25
small á > 0.  Thus, we are considering a small proportionate reduction of all taxes.  Substituting into
(15), and bearing in mind that the Slutsky matrix is negative semi-definite, we find that the right-
hand side is positive: a small proportionate reduction of all taxes is welfare-improving.  Note that
in the case being considered, optimum commodity taxes are zero.  Thus, in this case a small move
in the direction of the optimum from an arbitrary initial point t  is ways welfare-improving.o
The above illustration describes what is know as a "radial reform" of commodity taxes.
Another example is the "concertina reform", which consists of reducing the highest taxes only.  For
further discussion of these and other welfare-improving tax reforms under optimum lump-sum
transfers, the reader is referred to Dixit (1975).
3. The Generalised Ramsey Rule
3.1 The model
We now consider a generalised version of the problem discussed in the preceding section.26
To start with, we rewrite the vector of net demands of consumer h as x  (q, xG , m), where xG  is anh  h  h   h
n-dimensional vector of quantity constraints and x  (.) solves:h
mh / r h % jg èhg . Ðg (27)
 Strictly speaking we only need convexity in the space of commodities for which the quantity constraints are27
not binding. 
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Max. U (x ) s.t. q.x  = mh h h  h
   xh
x  # xG  for each ihi hi
Note that, subject to regularity conditions, the constrained demand functions xG (.)  have theh
standard properties with respect to q and m.  For instance, Roy’s identity and the Slutsky equationh
continue to apply.  Similarly, the Slutsky matrix S is symmetric and negative semi-definite and q.S
= 0.  The main difference is that the matrix S has columns of zero entries for commodities such that
the quantity constraint is binding (because a small change in the price of such a commodity works
like a change in lump-sum income).
The fixed income m of individual h consists of the sum of his or her share in private profitsh
and a lump-sum transfer (r) f om the government:h
where Ð / p.y  is the profit of firm g (see below) and è is the share of individual h in firm g'sg  g          hg
profits.
Next, we write the net supply vector of firm g (g = 1,...,G) as y  = y  (p,  ), where   is ag  g  g   g
vector of quantity constraints and y (.) solves:g
Max. p.y s.t. y  0 Yg g  g
         yg
y  #   for each ig  gi  i
with Y  denoting the production set of firm g which is assumed to be convex. Here again, theg             27
  A more sophisticated model would take into account the possibility of endogenous policy responses by28
government agencies not under the control of the planner.
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constrained supply functions y (.) have the standard properties with respect to p, the vector ofg
producer prices.  Note also that the quantity constraints enable us to treat the net supply vectors of
firms operating under constant returns to scale as functions rather than correspondences.
Let (p, t, {xG }, { }, {r}, {è }) be the vector of "signals" to which individuals and firmsh  g  h  hg
respond (bearing in mind (27) and the identity q / p + t).  The signals are of two types: exogenous
signals or "parameters", and control variables. The idea is that the "planner", who conducts the
optimization exercise below, chooses the variables within his or her control, taking other variables
as given.  Denoting the vectors of parameters and control variables as ù and s respectively, the28
planner chooses  to solve the following maximization problem:
Max. W(...,V(s;ù),...) s.t.      3 x (s;ù)-3 y (s;ù)-z=0       (P)h       h gh g
   s
where z is the vector of net supplies from the public sector.  As before (see (21)), V is h’s indirecth
utility function and W is a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function.
The model is restrictive in some respects (e.g. the dichotomous partitioning of signals
between exogenous variables and control variables), but it does encompass a wide range of models
in the second-best tradition.  The classical Ramsey tax problem, for instance, is a special case of this
model.  So is Diamond-Mirrlees's classic model of "optimum taxation and public production"
(Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971).  Similarly, the general equilibrium model underlying the project
evaluation manual by Little and Mirrlees (1974) can be expressed in the present format.  Note also
MSVk /
MV(
Mùk
/ M
Mùk
' jh MWMV h
MV h
Mùk
& í .M(x&y)
Mùk
(28)
 For an early discussion of this point, see Sen (1972).29
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that the basic model can be readily extended in various directions, e.g. to take into account Boiteux-
type budget constraints in the public sector.
3.2 Policy reform
Let V (ù,z) denote the maximum value function of (P).  From the envelope theorem, we*
know that the gradient of V* is the same as the gradient of the Lagrangean.  The latter m y be written
as:
 = W(...,V(s;ù),...) - í  [x(s;ù) - y(s;ù) - z]h
where x/Óx  and y/Óy  denote aggregate (net) consumer demands and aggregate (net) producerh   g
h  g
supplies, respectively, and í  is a vector of Lagrangean multipliers or shadow prices.  If ù  is ak
particular component of the vector ù of parameters (e.g. a tax, a lump-sum transfer, or a quantity
constraint), the marginal social value of ù , say MSV, is:k   k
The first term on the r.h.s. of (28) is the direct effect on social welfare, and the second term is the
social value of the additional excess demands generated by the proposed reform. Applying the same
reasoning to a small change dz in the public production plan, we find that the “project” dz is w lfare
improving if í .dz>0, i.e. if it makes a profit at shadow prices.  Of course, the shadow prices depend
on the specification of "choice variables".29
(s;ù) / W(...,V h(s;ù),...) % ë R (29)
R / í (.z % ô.x % ôp.y % 3g è
0g.Ðg & 3h r
h (30)
b h / MV
(
Mr h
' âh & í .( Mx
h
Mmh
) (31)
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      As shown in Drèze and Stern (1987), using Walras’ law, the Lagrangean may be rewritten as:
where R is the "shadow revenue" of the government.  The latter is defined as:
where í */í /ë is a vector of normalized shadow prices, ô/(q-í *) is a vector of shadow consumer
taxes (or “shadow taxes” for short), ô/(í *-p) is a vector of shadow producer taxes, and è /(1-3p          0g h
è ) is the government’s share in the profits of firm g.  Note that ë is basically a normalizationgh
parameter: a different cardinalization of the social welfare function W(.) leads to a different ë, but
leaves í */í /ë unchanged.  Equation (29) is extremely useful in so far as it converts this complex
general-equilibrium odel into the standard format of a trade-off between consumer welfare and
(shadow) government revenue, as in section 2.
To illustrate, let us consider a specific "parameter", say r (the lump-sum transfer going toh
individual h).  From (28), we may write the "marginal social value" of r (say b) as:h  h
where, as before, â  denotes the social marginal utility of h's income (see section 2.9).  Thus, theh
marginal social value of a lump-sum transfer to consumer h is simply the difference between his or
her social marginal utility and the shadow value of the additional consumer demands generated by
bh / MV
(
Mr h
' âh & ë (1 & ô. Mx
h
Mmh
) (32)
M
Mti
/ &âi xi % ë (xi % ô.
Mx
Mti
) (33)
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a transfer.  Equivalently, we can derive b from (29) and (30) as:h
The latter expression also follows from (31), the definition of í  and the adding-up property.  Note
that (32) is exactly the same as (24), with shadow taxes replacing actual taxes.
3.3 Commodity taxation
Turning to the specific issues of tax reform and optimum taxation in this general model, the
key point to note is that the gradient of (29) with respect to t is much the same as in the classical
Ramsey tax problem (see (3)).  Indeed, substituting q/p+t and ô/(q-í ) in (29) and using the*
standard properties of x (.) and V(.), it is easy to derive:   h   h
Comparing (33) with (3), there are two differences.  First, the term âx is r placed with âx, exactlyi    i i
as in the extension from the one-person to the many-person Ramsey rule (see section 2.9) - nothing
new here.  Second, in the last term on the right-hand side, the vector ô of shadow taxes replaces the
vector t of actual taxes.  Hence, the earlier results are readily extended, by simply replacing actual
taxes with shadow taxes where appropriate.  For instance, setting the right-hand-side of (33) equal
to zero and following the usual steps (as with the derivation of (17) and (26)), the first-order
conditions for optimum taxation lead to the generalised Ramsey rule:
ô.
Mx ci
Mq
xi
'
bi
ë
(34)
 The situation where consumer prices and shadow prices are collinear is known as "C-C efficiency"; for30
further discussion, see Guesnerie (1979).
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where, as before, b/3 (x /x)b and b is the marginal social value of a transfer to individual hi h i i
h h  h
(discussed in the previous section).  
By analogy with (13) in section 2, we can refer to the l.h.s. of (34) as the "generalised index
of relative discouragement".  The generalised index of discouragement is a useful tool to restate the
general principles of optimum taxation, bearing in mind the three core objectives stated in the
introduction: (1) resource allocation, (2) revenue collection, and (3) interpersonal distribution.  The
implications of the first objective can be seen by assuming optimum lump-sum transfers (i.e. b =h
0 for each h).  In that case, the generalised Ramsey rule states that the generalised index of
discouragement should be zero for each commodity.  If all taxes are unconstrained, this is achieved
by bringing consumer prices in line with shadow prices (ô=á.q for some á0, so that the left-hand
side of (34) is zero for each i). To  illustrate the implications, in a labour-surplus economy this30
would typically require subsidising labour-intensive commodities, since the latter would tend to have
a low shadow price (Drèze and Stern, 1987).  Similarly, in a foreign-exchange-scarce economy, it
may require taxing imported goods.
Note that this derivation is based on differentiating the Lagrangean with respect to t as if
producer prices (p) were constant.  This, however, does not require the assumption that prices are
  For further discussion on this point and related issues, see Drèze and Stern (1987, 1990).31
  Combinations of these different assumptions for different commodities are also possible (e.g. fixed prices32
for traded commodities and market-clearing prices for domestic commodities).
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actually constant.  If producer prices are among the "control variables", the derivation remains valid,
by the envelope theorem.  Further, it must be remembered that the "control variables" formally
include the market-clearing variables, i.e. the variables that implicitly adjust to clear the scarcity
constraints.  Seen in that light, the device of holding producer prices constant is much more general31
than it appears at first sight. More precisely, the derivation is valid if any of the following holds: (1)
producer prices are fixed (as in Diamond and Mirrlees, 1975); (2) producer prices adjust
endogenously to clear the scarcity constraints; (3) producer prices are directly controlled by the
planner.   If none of these assumptions apply, the mechanism through which producer prices are32
determined has to be specified in the form of additional constraints in the optimisation problem (e.g.
the requirement tham rginal revenue equals marginal cost, in the case of a commodity supplied by
a monopoly).  If the vector t enters in these additional constraints, the first-order conditions for
optimum taxation have to be correspondingly modified.
The requirements of revenue collection can be seen by continuing to assume that the
interpersonal distribution of income is optimal (b = b for each h, for some b), and also assuming thath
a switch from indirect taxation to lump-sum taxation would be welfare-improving (b > 0).  In that
case, the generalised Ramsey rule states that consumer price  should move away from shadow prices
in such a way that the generalised index of relative discouragement remains the same for each
commodity.  In the special case where one commodity can be assumed to have zero shadow tax
(through suitable normalization) and compensated cross-price demand elasticities among other
commodities are zero, we obtain the ge eralised inverse elasticity rule:
ôi '
b
ei
 Shadow prices, of course, are not (generally) independent of the tax system.  Strictly speaking, all the33
relevant control variables and shadow prices are simultaneously determined.  Nevertheless, the shadow-price approach
has much to commend in terms of conceptual clarity.  Further, in the context of "tax reform", shadow pric s can be taken
as given even though they may depend on the i itial vector of taxes.
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where e/(Mx /Mq)(q/x) is the compensated price elasticity of demand for good i.                i i i i i
c
Finally, to see the implications of concern for interpersonal equity, we relax the assumption
that b is the same for each h.  In that case, there has to be a further adjustment of consumer pricesh
to bring the vector of generalised indices of discouragement in line with the vector of net
distributional characteristics.  Typically, this would mean shifting taxes away from commodities
heavily consumed by transfer-deserving individuals.
All these principles make good intuitive sense.  The results illustrate the power of shadow
prices in acting as "sufficient statistics" for a general equilibrium model: different applications of the
general model outlined in section 3.1 lead to different shadow prices but, subject to the calculation
of shadow prices, the basic rules of tax reform and optimum taxation remain the same.  Shadow33
prices also provide a useful bridge between the theory of taxation, the theory of cost-benefit analysis,
and the theory of the second-best.
In the special case where shadow prices are proportional (without loss of generality, equal)
to producer prices, shadow taxes are the same as actual taxes and the results derived in section 2
apply as stated there. Thus, the classical Ramsey tax problem, which appears to have a partial-
equilibrium format, does have a general-equilibrium foundation, as long as shadow prices and
  The conditions  under which shadow prices are proportional to producer prices are discussed in Drèze and34
Stern (1987, 1990).  In the opening paragraph of his paper, Ramsey (1927) shows some awareness of this feature of his
model: "...I shall suppose that, in Professor Pigou's terminology, private and social net products are always equal or have
been made so by State interference not included in the taxation we are considering" (p.47).
  For one example (among many), see Dixit (1975).35
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producer prices coincide.34
The preceding discussion focuses on optimum taxation, but similar extensions of the standard
results apply in the context of tax reform.  For example, the conditions for radial and concertina
reforms to be welfare improving still go through but with tax reductions suitably defined in the space
of shadow taxes.  The details are left to the reader.
4. Optimum Distribution: Interpretation and implications
Policy reforms are often evaluated from the point of view of "efficiency" by looking at their
implications as if distribution did not matter.  But what is meant by the latter assumption?  At least35
two interpretations are possible:
(A1) Equal marginal social utilities: â  = â for all h (for some â).h
(A2) Equal marginal social values of transfer: b = b for all h (for some b).h
Assumption (A1) states that the social valuation of the marginal utility of income is the same for all
individuals.  (A2) states that a small income transfer between any two individuals would leave social
welfare unchanged.  The two assumptions have often been used interchangeably in the literature.
However, they are not identical, bearing in mind that actual transfers have allocative implications
âh & bh/ í Mx
h
Mmh
/ ë (1 & ô Mx
h
Mmh
) (35)
  The shadow tax-propensity is essentially a weighted average of shadow tax rates, with marginal propensities36
to consume as weights.  With suitable normalization, the shadow tax-propensity may also be interpreted as the
covariance between the vector of shadow tax rates and the vector of marginal propensities to consume.
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(captured in b, but not in â - see sections 2.9 and 3.2).  To illustrate, it is sometimes argued thath     h
otherwise welfare-improving transfers from the rich to the poor may not be desirable in a savings-
constrained economy, if theric  have a higher marginal propensity to save than the poor (see Drèze
and Stern, 1987, p.966).  In other words, equalizing marg nal social values of transfer need not entail
equalizing marginal social utilities (and vice-versa).
It is also useful to introduce a stronger version of (A2):
(A2') Optimum transfers: b = 0 for all h.h
Note that (A2') involves the further assumption of optimum distribution between consumers and the
government: a small transfer from the government to any individual leaves social welfare unchanged.
When are (A1) and (A2) equivalent?  Recalling the definition of b (see (31) and(32)), weh
have:
Thus, â  and b essentially differ by a constant minus the "shadow tax-propensity" (the last term inh h
(35)), so that (A1) and (A2) are equivalent if and only if the latter is the same for all individuals.36
It is easy to see that a sufficient condition for this to hold is the following:
â & b/ í R (36)
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(B1) Proportional shadow taxes: í  = ã.q for some ã > 0 (i.e. ô/q is the same for all i).i i
Condition (B1) is also necessary for (A1) and (A2) to be equivalent if the (nxH) matrix R with
elements R / (Mx / Mm)  has rank n.  To see this, first write (35) in vector form as follows:ih  i
h h
where â / {â } and b / {b}.  Note also that q.R = 1, where 1 indicates a vector of ones.  If bothh h
(A1) and (A2) hold, then there is a constant c such that b = â - c.1.  Thus
                                    í .R / â - b = c.1 = c.q.R                                                (37)
If R has rank n, (38) implies that í andq are collinear, i.e. shadow taxes are proportional.
For the rank condition to be satisfied, there have to be at least as many consumers as there
are commodities, and the H vectors of marginal propensities to consume should span a space of
dimension no less than n.  In other words, there has to be adequate diversity of (marginal) spending
patterns.  When the rank condition holds, any divergence between í  and q makes it impossible for
both (A1) and (A2) to be satisfied.
The following is a corollary of the reasoning so far:
Proposition 1: If R has rank n, then (B1) is necessary and sufficient for (A1) and (A2) to be
equivalent; further, any two of (A1), (A2) and (B1) imply the third.
  There is no need to distinguish here between "compensating" and "equivalent" variations, since we are37
looking at marginal changes.
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When the rank condition is not satisfied, assumptions other than (B1) can be made to ensure that
shadow tax-propensities are identical (so that (A1) and (A2) are equivalent).  One such assumption
is that everyone has the same marginal propensity to consume, for each commodity (the extreme
opposite of the assumption of "adequate diversity").  Another one is that, for each individual,
marginal propensities to consume are uncorrelated with shadow taxes.  Obviously, all these
assumptions are restrictive.
To see why the divergence of shadow tax propensities is an issue, consider any feasible
"reform" such t at the gainers gain more than the losers lose (where any person's net gain or loss is
measured in terms of income equivalent).  If (A1) holds, then the reform is welfare-improving.37
Sometimes it is argued that even if (A1) does not hold, the reform can be justified on efficiency
grounds, in the sense that "the gainers could compensate the losers".  However, unless shadow tax-
propensities are identical, transfers from the gainers to the losers have efficiency implications that
need further examination, so that the status of the compensation argument is unclear.  At best, it is
a "notional compensation" argument of dubious ethical relevance.
To see the problem from another angle, we have noted that under assumption (A2'), simple
directions of welfare-improving tax reform can be identified.  Further results along those lines (with
straightforward generalisations in the space of shadow taxes) are presented in Dixit (1975).  As the
author puts it, the results hold "assuming that there are no distributional problems".  However, in
general (A2') conflicts with (A1), in which case there is "a distributional problem" even if (A2')
holds.
ô. Mx
Mqi
xi
' c
  The argument focuses on first-order conditions; as noted earlier, second-order conditions have rarely been38
examined in the literature.
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We now turn to the respective implications of (A1), (A2) and (A2') for the structure of
optimum taxes.  Under (A2), the one-person Ramsey rule applies: for optimum taxes, the38
generalised index of relative discouragement has to be the same for all co modities.  This follows
from (34), with b= b for all i.  A corollary is that, under the stronger assumption of optimumi
transfers (A2'), optimum taxes are such that shadow taxes are proportional (i.e. C-C efficiency); this
has already been discussed in the preceding section.  Finally, returning to (A1), the correct optimum
tax rule in this case is that the normalised MDL (evaluated using shadow taxes) should be the same
for all commodities, i.e.:
for some non-zero constant c (this follows from setting the right-hand side of (33) equal to zero).
In short, in a second-best world there is no simple way of avoiding distributional issues, even
by assumption (i.e. there is no unique way of stating the assumption that "distributional issues have
been resolved").  Distributional assumptions have to be made explicit, bearing in mind that they lead
to different tax rules.
5. Concluding Remarks
In a wide class of models, the problem of optimum taxation is usefully split into two parts:
the calculation of "shadow prices" and the application of the generalised Ramsey rule.  The relevant
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shadow prices depend on the structure of the economy, the range of choice variables and the social
welfare function, but the generalised R msey rule itself is quite robust.  This way of approaching the
problem is more transparent and productive than the compilation of a long catalogue of tax rules for
different types of distorted economies, as has been done in much of the literature on the second-best.
In models where the generalised Ramsey rule applies, the main issue is to identify the relevant
shadow prices.  In other models, the basic task is to identify the reasons why the rule does not apply
(e.g. interdep ndence between consumer demands and producer prices, independently of consumer
prices), and to derive suitable extensions of the general rule.
Similar principles apply in the field of tax reform.  Here again, the problem is usefully split
between calculation of shadow prices and application of general principles for the identification of
welfare-improving reforms in the space of "shadow taxes".  One of these principles is that, under
specifc distributional assumptions, "radial" reforms in the space of shadow taxes (i.e. small tax
changes that bring consumer prices closer to shadow prices) are welfare-improving.  Care must be
taken, however, in identifying and assessing the relevant distributional assumptions.  In particular,
we have noted a possible tension between the assumptions of "equal marginal social utility" and
"equal marginal social values of transfer", which are often used interchangeably in the literature.
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